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A DANGEROUS DISAPPEARING ACT: 
PRESERVING AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN 
THE FACE OF MATURING MORTGAGES 
KAITLIN J. BROWN* 
Abstract: By the year 2020, almost all of the affordable housing units created by 
Sections 221(d)(3) and 226 of the Housing Act of 1937 could disappear. These 
units were created in the late 1960s in an effort to draw more private equity to the 
affordable housing market. The federal government entered into contracts with 
developers, exchanging mortgage subsidies and insurance for affordability claus-
es in the developers’ mortgages that required a certain percentage of their devel-
opments be kept for affordable housing for the life of the mortgage. These mort-
gages were set for a term of forty years. The country is now faced with an un-
precedented housing crisis as these mortgages reach their maturity mark. Unfor-
tunately, the federal government lacks the funding and political will to pass the 
necessary legislation to protect the current stock of affordable housing. Further-
more, only a handful of states have taken the lead in efforts to preserve afforda-
bility through new laws that impose notice requirements on owners of develop-
ments reaching maturity, and afford rights of first offer and first refusal to local 
housing authorities so that they may purchase these properties to retain afforda-
bility. This Note argues that more states should adopt such laws to ensure that the 
tens of thousands of families who are bound to lose their subsidized housing are 
provided reasonable protections. 
INTRODUCTION 
Tina Amenta lived with her husband in a Colorado town in a rental unit 
subsidized by the Fort Collins Housing Authority (“FCHA”).1 She, along with 
dozens of other families, was forced to pack up and move when the FCHA de-
cided to sell eighty-eight of its 154 public housing units.2 The FCHA sold the 
units because, as a local housing agency, it did not receive enough government 
funds to refurbish and maintain each unit.3 Fort Collins families were “heart-
                                                                                                                           
 * Editor-in-Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 See Pat Ferrier, 88 Fort Collins Families Displaced by Public Housing Shift, COLORADOAN, 
Aug. 3, 2013, available at http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20130803/NEWS01/308030029/88-
Fort-Collins-families-displaced-by-public-housing-shift. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. 
60 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:59 
broken” to leave their homes.4 The FCHA provided vouchers to the displaced 
residents to supplement rent at a new development.5 Nonetheless, many of the 
displaced tenants could not find new affordable housing because affordable 
rental units in Fort Collins, as in many places around the United States, are 
extremely scarce.6 
Because Ms. Amenta can only afford two hundred dollars for monthly 
rent, she cannot afford to rent a market-rate apartment; that is, she must either 
find another affordable unit or risk homelessness.7 
* * * 
In early 2011, low-income tenants of the Los Angeles neighborhood of 
Arlington Heights received letters from their landlord notifying them of signif-
icant rent increases, in some cases doubling their monthly payment.8 The rent 
increase forced some tenants, including many long-term residents, to move.9 
Similarly, in 2011, residents of the Burbank Apartments development in Bos-
ton’s Fenway neighborhood were informed that more than 170 affordable hous-
ing units, representing ten percent of the neighborhood’s affordable housing, 
were being converted to market-rate units.10 The development’s owner, First 
Realty Management, decided to opt out of its Section 8 contract and convert 
the affordable units to market rate.11 The current tenants were promised 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id.; JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUS-
ING 2013, at 29–30 (2013), [hereinafter STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING], available at http://www.
jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2013.pdf (noting the current shortage of affordable 
housing throughout the United States). The FCHA has a waiting list of 1900 families. Ferrier, supra 
note 1. 
 7 See People to End Homelessness, Inc. v. Develco Singles Apartments Assocs., 339 F.3d 1, 3 
(1st Cir. 2003) (discussing that tenants with subsidized housing pay less than the market rate); Ferrier, 
supra note 1. Ms. Amenta rents an apartment at a level that is subsidized by the FCHA. Ferrier, supra 
note 1. The FCHA pays the owner the difference between the rent Ms. Amenta can afford and the 
“market rate” the owner could otherwise earn. See id. Local housing authorities, such as FCHA, par-
ticipate in a number of federal programs to be able to offer affordable rental units to low-income fami-
lies. See generally Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues 
Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413 (2004) (discussing the history of affordable 
housing programs). 
 8 See Adam Cowing, The Latest Threat: How Mortgage Maturity Jeopardizes Affordable Hous-
ing, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 233, 233 (2012). 
 9 See id. at 233–34. 
 10 See Sara Brown, At Hearing, Fenway Residents Fight Loss of Affordable Housing at Burbank 
Apartments, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:57 AM), http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/fenway-
kenmore/2011/03/fenway_residents_fight_loss_of.html. 
 11 Id. The “Section 8” program was created by the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) in 1974 and is governed largely by the Housing Act of 1937. People to End 
Homelessness, 339 F.3d at 3; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012) (authorizing HUD to enter into Section 8 
contracts with public housing agencies to subsidize rent for low-income tenants). The purpose of Sec-
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vouchers from First Realty Management to subsidize their current or future 
apartments.12 Once the current tenants move out of their units, however, the 
units will no longer be available as subsidized housing.13 
When the owners of developments such as Burbank Apartments and Ar-
lington Heights purchased their respective properties, they did so with the as-
sistance of a number of government programs.14 In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
U.S. Congress established federal housing programs to incentivize private in-
vestment in the affordable housing market.15 Through these federal programs, 
owners were able to borrow money from the bank to buy the development at 
an interest rate far below the market rate at the time.16 The U.S. government 
subsidized the low interest rate by promising to pay the bank the resulting dif-
ference in interest rates.17 These very low interest rates made it affordable for 
developers to build new units.18 As a condition of these mortgage deals, the 
owners had to contractually agree to maintain a certain number of units as af-
fordable housing.19 In other words, the owners promised to charge below-
market rent for some of the units, which they would rent to low-income ten-
ants.20 These promises were memorialized in the mortgages the owners 
                                                                                                                           
tion 8 is to “aid[] low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and [to promote] economi-
cally mixed housing . . . .” See § 1437f(a); People to End Homelessness, 338 F.3d at 3. Under Section 
8, HUD and the private developers enter into Housing Assistance Payment Contracts (“HAPs”), 
which set the maximum monthly rent that the owner may charge for each unit. People to End Home-
lessness, 338 F.3d at 3. In Section 8 developments, the subsidized tenants pay the property owner a 
portion of their income, usually no more than thirty percent. Id. The government pays the difference 
between the tenant’s payments and the market rate. Id. 
 12 See Brown, supra note 10. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 234–35; Brown, supra note 10; Emily Achtenberg, Maturing 
Mortgages: The Next Frontier of the Expiring Use Crisis 5 (Ctr. for Soc. Pol’y, Univ. of Mass. Bos., 
Working Paper No. 2009-8, 2009) (discussing the early government programs that enabled developers 
to purchase properties so long as the properties contained affordable housing). 
 15 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 234–35. In 1961, the Senate held hearings concerning the Nation-
al Housing Act where senators voiced their concern about the nation’s developing homelessness prob-
lems as well as the “sluggishness” in the homebuilding industry. See COMM. ON BANKING & CUR-
RENCY, HOUSING ACT OF 1961, S. REP. NO. 87-281, at 3 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1186, 1192. Some of the stated purposes of the amendments to the National Housing Act included to 
“enable private enterprise to participate to the maximum extent in meeting the housing needs of mod-
erate-income families,” and “to encourage rehabilitation and improvement of existing properties by 
establishing a long-term, low-interest rate improvement and rehabilitation program within the medium 
of FHA loan insurance . . . .” Id. at 1–2, 4. 
 16 See Williams, supra note 7, at 429–30. 
 17 See Michael Quirk, Note, Preserving Project-Based Housing in Massachusetts: Why the 
Voucher Discrimination Law Falls Short, 30 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 651, 657–58 (2010–2011). 
 18 See id. at 657. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. HUD defines “low income” as determined by taking a certain percentage of the median 
family income (“MFI”) per geographic area defined by the Office of Management and Budget’s met-
ropolitan area definitions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
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signed.21 These mortgages—and the promises to maintain affordable units—
were set to expire, or mature, after forty years.22 
Hundreds of thousands of mortgages for these federal programs—along 
with the use restrictions within the mortgages—have expired or will expire 
before 2020.23 Once the restrictions expire, owners may rent the units at mar-
ket rates.24 Most of the current tenants are low-income families and individuals 
who will not be able to afford the higher rent when the units are converted.25 
These families and individuals will likely have to move out and look for new, 
affordable housing, a task that may prove to be extremely difficult because of 
the already existing deficit of available affordable units.26 
In 2011, there were 12.1 million “extremely low-income” renters in the 
United States—2.5 million more than in 2007.27 Meanwhile, in the same year, 
there were only 6.8 million housing units affordable for extremely low-income 
renters—135,000 units fewer than in 2007.28 The scarcity of these affordable 
housing units has only been amplified by the maturing mortgage crisis; due in 
part to this crisis, between 2001 and 2011, the permanent stock of affordable 
housing in the United States decreased by 12.8 percent.29 
                                                                                                                           
NOTICE PDR-2014-03 1–3 (2013) [hereinafter HUD NOTICE PDR-2014-03]. The income limits used 
for the Section 236 program in 2014 were the same as the Section 8 low-income limits, which are 
statutorily defined. See § 1437a(b)(2). These income limits are normally set at eighty percent of an 
area’s MFI for a family of four, and are adjusted for family size and unusually high or low housing 
costs. Id. 
 21 See Quirk, supra note 17, at 657 n.35 (citing Cienega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 
1234–35 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (describing the execution of deeds of trust and mortgage notes under the 
subsidized mortgage programs). 
 22 See id. 
 23 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 238 (stating that the mortgage maturity crisis is predicted to affect 
190,000 units between 2012 and 2020). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. at 242 (noting that the effect of mortgage maturity includes the loss of affordable rent 
and possible relocation, particularly for those families who live in unassisted units); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (2012) (mandating that tenants in subsidized units fit the definition of low- or 
extremely low-income). 
 26 See STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING, supra note 6, at 5; Cowing, supra note 8, at 241 (not-
ing that in Los Angeles, residents of units with these federally subsidized mortgages will be forced to 
move out of their homes); Williams, supra note 7, at 442–43 (noting the current large nationwide 
waitlist for individuals seeking subsidized housing). The stock of affordable housing available to 
households with less than thirty percent of the area median income is shrinking. STATE OF THE NA-
TION’S HOUSING, supra note 6, at 5. According to HUD estimates, only one in four of those eligible 
for rental assistance obtain this help. Id. 
 27 STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING, supra note 6, at 5 (defining “extremely-low income” 
households as any household with only thirty percent of the area’s median income). 
 28 Id. at 29–30. A family’s “affordable rent” is defined by statute and is based on the area’s median 
family income. See HUD NOTICE PDR-2014-03, supra note 20, at 2. 
 29 See STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING, supra note 6, at 29 (providing the percentage of low-
income housing lost nationwide between 2001 and 2011); Edward J. Sullivan & Karin Power, Coming 
Affordable Housing Challenges for Municipalities After the Great Recession, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 
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These statistics are replicated on the state level.30 In Massachusetts, the 
mortgages in approximately 130 subsidized properties—totaling nearly 17,000 
units—will mature by 2019, while in California, Los Angeles County alone 
will see fifty-seven properties—comprising more than 5,000 units—mature by 
2015.31 Many of the properties with maturing subsidized mortgages are located 
in cities like Boston and Los Angeles, and are in neighborhoods that have gen-
trified since these developments were built in the 1960s.32 Owners in gentrified 
neighborhoods have a significant incentive to convert these apartments to market 
rates and charge as much as possible in monthly rent.33 In short, current owners 
are able to earn higher profits on the open market than through government sub-
sidies.34 Because this sudden depletion of the affordable housing stock is set to 
occur at a time when the number of households needing these affordable units is 
actually increasing, the United States is facing a looming housing crisis.35 
This Note examines the crisis of the loss of hundreds of thousands of 
units due to the expiration of government-subsidized mortgages and Section 8 
contracts. Part I discusses the history of affordable housing in the United States, 
including the impetus for housing programs for low-income tenants and the 
program’s evolution over the last fifty years. Part II presents the impending 
crisis caused by the imminent expiration of hundreds of thousands of these 
mortgages. In particular, Part II discusses the weaknesses of past legislative 
attempts by federal and state governments to address this crisis, and describes 
why litigious efforts to maintain affordable housing have fallen short. Finally, 
Part III proposes that states should adopt preservation statutes similar to the 
statute adopted in Massachusetts in order to address the crisis in the short term. 
State statutes that require notice prior to conversion of affordable housing, and 
mandate that owners give state housing authorities rights of first offer and first 
                                                                                                                           
& CMTY. DEV. L. 297, 307 (2013) (noting that for owners of subsidized units who are located in competi-
tive markets, “the temptation to convert [their subsidized units] at the conclusion of their HUD contracts 
to market-rate rents may be too financially appealing to resist”). 
 30 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 240; Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 3. 
 31 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 240; Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 3. 
 32 See Rachel D. Godsil, The Gentrification Trigger: Autonomy, Mobility, and Affirmatively Fur-
thering Fair Housing, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 319, 333–34 (2013) (describing gentrification trends in 
New York City, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago). 
 33 See id. at 334 (noting that gentrification’s displacement of both residents and businesses is a 
result of increased demand for housing and commercial space, which results in higher rental and pur-
chase prices); Sullivan & Power, supra note 29, at 307 (noting the natural incentive to convert apart-
ments to market rate in neighborhoods where demand for housing is high because market rents are 
high). 
 34 See Sullivan & Power, supra note 29, at 307. 
 35 See id. (noting that approximately twenty-one percent of HUD-subsidized mortgages will ma-
ture by 2013 and properties located in competitive markets with low vacancy rates and high average 
market rents will likely lose their affordability when the owners convert their units). 
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refusal, provide state governments, non-profits, and tenant organizations the time 
and legal recourse to preserve existing affordable housing. 
I. THE TORTURED HISTORY OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN  
THE UNITED STATES 
The lack of affordable housing in the United States has been an intracta-
ble policy issue since the mid-twentieth century.36 On the heels of the Great 
Depression, the United States experienced a dramatic increase in homeless-
ness.37 In the 1930s and 1940s, Congress attempted to address the crisis primari-
ly by providing affordable housing through government-run projects.38 Govern-
ment housing was established with the goal of providing decent and affordable 
housing to any citizen.39 Due to the high costs of building and maintaining 
these projects, however, the government struggled to meet the nation’s housing 
needs.40 As a result, many members of Congress, who questioned the cost and 
efficiency of public housing, quickly challenged the implementation of gov-
ernment-run housing projects.41 
Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government began experimenting 
with programs to involve the private sector in the provision of affordable hous-
ing.42 Rather than continuing to wholly fund and operate its own affordable 
housing projects, the federal government under the Kennedy and Johnson ad-
ministrations began providing incentives for private developers to build and 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Michael Freedman, Note, In Search of Congressional Intent: Does LIHPRHA Restrict State 
and Local Governments from Preserving Affordable Housing?, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 741, 749–60 (2005) 
(discussing the history of preservation programs and their shortcomings); Achtenberg, supra note 14, 
at 5–6 (discussing fifty years of housing policy). 
 37 See Williams, supra note 7, at 427. 
 38 See id. at 427–29; see also United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 
888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2012)) (establishing the United States Housing 
Authority and loans to low-rent housing). 
 39 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (2006). 
 40 See Alexander Von Hoffman, A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Hous-
ing Act of 1949, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 299, 303, 310 (2000). 
 41 See id. at 303. Following the passage of the Housing Act of 1937, the program encountered 
sustained political challenges. Id. Between 1938 and 1942, anti-New Deal politicians were elected to 
Congress and eventually succeeded in cutting off funding for this early public housing program. Id. In 
1949, Congress passed a new Housing Act, which restored many of the federal housing programs, 
including a new commitment to building 810,000 new low-rent public housing units over the follow-
ing six years. Id. at 310; see also United States Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 
413, 428 (1949) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2012)). Immediately after its passage, 
however, the Housing Act of 1949 was mired in political opposition due to objections to federally 
funded housing in general as well as objections to racial integration. Id. While the goal of the 1949 
Act was to construct 810,000 units within six years, it took the federal government twenty years to 
complete this goal. Id. 
 42 See Von Hoffman, supra note 40, at 319. 
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maintain affordable housing under the programs commonly known as Section 
221(d)(3) and Section 236.43 In 1965, former President Johnson created the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which took on the 
responsibility of providing housing opportunities for low-income individuals.44 
Then, in the 1970s, the Nixon administration pushed new legislation through 
Congress, ultimately signed by President Ford, which established the Section 8 
program within HUD.45 Taken together, these new programs were initially 
successful in harnessing the power of the private sector.46 Each of these pro-
grams, though, had inherent expiration dates.47 These expiration dates form the 
foundation of the current looming housing crisis.48 
A. Subsidized Mortgages and the Section 8 Program 
As the federal government sought to exit the direct housing market, it 
looked for ways to spur the private market to provide more affordable hous-
ing.49 The U.S. Senate developed the first government incentive program—
referred to as Section 221(d)(3)—under the 1961 Housing Act, to “enable pri-
vate enterprise to participate to the maximum extent in meeting the housing 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 236, 82 Stat. 476 
(1968) (establishing a federally funded mortgage subsidy to private developers, known as Section 
236); Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 101, § 221(d)(3), 75 Stat. 149, 149–50 (1961) (estab-
lishing the below-market interest rate program, known as Section 221(d)(3)); Von Hoffman, supra 
note 40, at 318–19. 
 44 See Williams, supra note 7, at 429. In 1965, Congress created HUD with the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development Act, and also transferred the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) to HUD. See Housing & Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79 Stat. 667, 667 
(1965); 24 C.F.R. § 200.1 (1968). 
 45 Von Hoffman, supra note 40, at 320; see Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012)); Quirk 
supra note 17, at 659. 
 46 See Williams, supra note 7, at 429–30 (noting that Section 236’s privately run housing pro-
grams in part helped to create more housing by the 1970s than had been created over forty years by 
the federally run public housing programs, and noting that Section 8 was likely the most successful 
affordable housing program for low-income people). But see Von Hoffman, supra note 40, at 319 
(stating that because Section 221(d)(3) was not initially successful, Congress passed Section 236 to 
supplement its efforts). 
 47 See Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X), 503 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (dis-
cussing that the mortgages created under Sections 221(d)(3) and 236 were meant to last forty years, 
but that they also had prepayment clauses that allowed owners to pay off their mortgages after twenty 
years); People to End Homelessness, Inc. v. Develco Singles Apartments Assocs., 339 F.3d 1, 3 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (noting that owners are not required to renew their Section 8 contracts upon the contract’s 
expiration). 
 48 See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 5. 
 49 See Williams, supra note 7, at 429. 
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needs of moderate-income families.”50 Under Section 221(d)(3), the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), the precursor to HUD, implemented the Be-
low-Market Interest Rate (“BMIR”) program, which insured mortgages at be-
low-market rates for property owners who provided affordable rental housing.51 
Under the BMIR program, project owners entered into mortgage contracts with 
private lenders at the market rate, and these mortgage contracts were later pur-
chased by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”).52 The FNMA 
was then able to charge the owners below-market interest rates and subsidize the 
difference using government funds.53 Still, the BMIR did not attract the response 
from the private market that the government expected, leaving the program 
dependent on federal funding.54 
To address the lack of private sector participation, Congress amended the 
Housing Act and created a new program under the Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Act of 1968, known as Section 236.55 Under the Section 236 program, 
the federal government subsidized interest rates on private market-rate mort-
gages, allowing private developers to obtain mortgages at very low interest 
rates.56 These programs were available until 1973, when President Nixon sus-
pended the programs indefinitely.57 
The mortgages signed under Sections 221(d)(3) and 236 were usually for 
a term of forty years and contained use restrictions to ensure that the property 
continued to provide affordable housing as long as it benefited from the gov-
ernment mortgage subsidy or mortgage insurance.58 This meant that, for a term 
of forty years, these mortgage holders would receive government benefits such 
as favorable interest rates and tax rates, and in return would provide a guaran-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 101, § 221(d)(3), 75 Stat. 149, 149–50 (1961) 
(enabling Section 221(d)(3) in Section 101) (1961); COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, HOUSING 
ACT OF 1961, S. REP. NO. 87-281, at 4 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1186, 1192. 
 51 See Housing Act of 1961 § 101; Cowing, supra note 8, at 235 (noting the BMIR program was 
implemented pursuant to Section 221(d)(3)). 
 52 See Housing Act of 1961 § 101; Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1270 (explaining the historical legisla-
tion). 
 53 See Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1270. 
 54 See Von Hoffman, supra note 40, at 319; Lawrence Geller, Expiring Use Restrictions: Their 
Impact and Enforceability, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 158 (1989). 
 55 See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 236, 82 Stat. 476 
(1968); Von Hoffman, supra note 40, at 319. 
 56 See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 5; Geller, supra note 54, at 157–58; Quirk, supra note 17, at 
658. 
 57 See Von Hoffman, supra note 40, at 320 (noting that, in response to corruption and economic 
inefficiencies, President Nixon issued a moratorium on all federal housing program in 1973). 
 58 See Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1270–71. Under both Sections 221(d)(3) and 236, owners entered 
into regulatory contracts with HUD, which required that important management decisions, including 
rent increases, be approved by HUD. Id. at 1271. The agreements also limited the profit that owners 
could make on their initial equity investment to six percent. Id. 
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teed source of affordable housing.59 As a further incentive, the government 
added a provision to the restricted use mortgages that allowed developers to 
pay off their mortgages after twenty years (an action known as “prepaying” the 
mortgage).60 This enabled developers to choose to leave the government con-
tract for the open market if it was more lucrative to the developers.61 At the 
time this provision was written, Congress did not consider what would happen 
if, all at once, many of these mortgagors decided to exit the affordable housing 
market at the twenty-year mark.62 Rather, members of Congress focused on the 
goal of incentivizing private developers to take over the provision of afforda-
ble housing from the government.63 
The Sections 221(d)(3) and 236 programs were popular amongst devel-
opers in the 1960s and 1970s.64 By the end of the 1970s, twelve years after its 
implementation, the public-private government housing programs had pro-
duced more housing units than the federally run public housing programs had 
produced in over forty years.65 By the mid-1970s, however, the subsidized 
mortgage programs were facing serious issues, particularly the Section 236 
program, which was hampered by foreclosures, inefficiency, and high costs.66 
Consequently, in 1973, President Nixon issued a moratorium on all federal 
housing programs.67 
In 1974, Congress created the Section 8 rental housing assistance program 
under the Housing and Community Development Act to supplement the afforda-
ble housing legislation of the 1960s.68 Section 8 became permanent in 1987.69 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See id. 
 60 See Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega IV), 194 F.3d 1231, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 61 See id. 
 62 See Geller, supra note 54, at 161. See generally Housing and Urban Development Legislation 
and Urban Insurance: Hearing on H.R. 15624, H.R. 15625, and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. 
on Hous. of the H. Comm. On Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 83–84 (1968) [hereinafter HUD 
Hearing] (detailing interest in attracting private capital and growing the housing stock, but lacking 
discussion on dangers of prepayment). 
 63 See HUD Hearing, supra note 62, at 83–84 (noting the goal of “attracting large amounts of 
private equity money into the provision of low and moderate income housing”); Geller, supra note 54, 
at 161; see also 111 CONG. REC. 6811–12 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1965) (statement by Senator Javits intro-
ducing the Moderate Income Housing Act of 1965 to address one of the “greatest deficiencies” in the 
federal housing program: the lack of new housing construction by private enterprise). 
 64 See Williams, supra note 7, at 430. 
 65 See id. Section 236 in conjunction with Section 235—a similar program that also provided 
subsidized interest rates—produced more low-income housing units than other public housing initia-
tives. Id. 
 66 See Von Hoffman, supra note 40, at 320. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 633 
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012)); see Quirk, supra note 17, at 659. 
 69 See Housing & Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 141, 101 Stat. 
1815 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1437 (2006)); Williams, supra note 7, at 441. 
68 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:59 
The Section 8 program has two primary components: project-based assistance 
and tenant-based assistance.70 Under Section 8, rental vouchers are given to ei-
ther individual tenants or assigned to particular developments.71 Tenants apply 
for a Section 8 voucher through their local public housing authority, which ad-
ministers the federal program.72 Tenants who hold a tenant-based voucher are 
able to access Section 8 subsidized rents for any housing unit that meets HUD’s 
regulatory standards for quality and rent reasonableness.73 
Project-based vouchers are tied to a particular development.74 Tenants who 
decide to move away from a development with project-based vouchers lose the 
guarantee of subsidized rent.75 Pursuant to the project-based Section 8 program, 
the federal government enters into Housing Assistance Payment (“HAP”) con-
tracts with private development owners.76 These HAP contracts allow project 
owners to charge a lower rate to qualified tenants and bill the government for 
the difference between the subsidized rate and fair market rate.77 The contracts, 
executed between the government and private owners in the 1970s, were typi-
cally for terms between five and twenty years, with an option provided to the 
private owners to renew.78 The Section 8 program continues to be a major ve-
                                                                                                                           
 70 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(6)–(7) (2012) (defining project-based and tenant-based assistance); 
§ 1437f(o) (codifying the Section 8 voucher program). 
 71 See § 1437f(o)(1) (providing that HUD may enter into Section 8 contracts with individual ten-
ants through the local housing authority); § 1437f(o)(13) (providing that HUD may enter into con-
tracts with individual housing developments through the local housing authority); Quirk, supra note 
17, at 660. With vouchers, tenants only pay a portion of their total monthly rent (and the government 
pays the remainder), and a tenant’s total monthly rent typically does not exceed thirty percent of that 
tenant’s monthly income. Quirk, supra note 17, at 660. Units must qualify for Section 8 assistance 
under the statute by meeting certain quality standards and charging a reasonable rent. See 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.1 (2014). 
 72 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2014) 
 73 Quirk, supra note 17, at 660; see 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2014). 
 74 Quirk, supra note 17, at 660. Under the current Housing Choice Voucher Program, the project-
based component allows public housing agencies to base a portion of their housing choice vouchers in 
specific housing developments. See Amy Glassman, Project-Based Voucher Reforms Will Facilitate 
Development of Affordable Units but Should Be Taken Further, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. 
DEV. L. 71, 78 n.2 (2008). Older project-based Section 8 programs included funding for substantial 
rehabilitation, new construction, and moderate rehabilitation of low-income funding. Id. These older 
programs have been repealed. See id. 
 75 See Quirk, supra note 17, at 660. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See People to End Homelessness, 339 F.3d at 3 (noting that HAP contracts were entered into in 
the 1970s); Cowing, supra note 8, at 236 (noting that the original Section 8 contracts “lasted between 
five to twenty years, with options to renew”). After 1981, HUD did not authorize any new HAP con-
tracts. See Williams, supra note 7, at 440. This means that the only source of affordable housing under 
this program derives from those developments that entered into a HAP contract prior to 1981. See id. 
Property owners had complete discretion over whether or not to renew a HAP contract at the end of the 
term. See Cowing, supra note 8, at 236. 
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hicle for affordable housing.79 Both the HAP contracts and the government-
subsidized mortgages under Sections 221(d)(3) and 236, however, pose the 
risk of a massive and sudden conversion to market-rate units when their re-
spective contracts expire.80 This is precisely the problem that the federal gov-
ernment faced in the 1980s.81 
B. The Prepayment Crisis of the 1980s 
Along with changes to the tax code, options given to developers to prepay 
subsidized mortgages and to decline to renew HAP contracts created an afford-
able housing crisis in the 1980s.82 The government’s assumption that the af-
fordable housing programs would replenish themselves and that participating 
owners would remain in the program proved shortsighted.83 The housing mar-
ket fundamentally began to change in the 1980s.84 Wealthy individuals began 
moving from the suburbs back to the cities in a movement known as gentrifica-
tion.85 This migration occurred at an increasing rate, causing housing costs to 
skyrocket as previously undesirable, low-value neighborhoods turned into 
high-rent, high-return opportunities for property owners.86 In addition, changes 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Williams, supra note 7, at 441. Between 1974 and 2000, the number of households partici-
pating in the Section 8 program grew from 30,000 to 1.4 million. Id. 
 80 See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 5; Sullivan & Power, supra note 29, at 307 (noting that 
twenty-one percent of HUD’s subsidized mortgages were scheduled to mature by 2013). 
 81 See Sullivan & Power, supra note 29, at 307. While project-based Section 8 developments 
carry a risk similar to the 221(d)(3) and 236 mortgage programs, tenant-based assistance does not suf-
fer from the same type of inherent expiration date. See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 5. Nevertheless, 
the Section 8 tenant-based assistance program is oversubscribed and not accessible to many new low-
income tenants. See Williams, supra note 7, at 442. The national average waiting time for a Section 8 
tenant voucher was twenty-eight months, and the wait time in large cities is typically much longer. Id. 
at 442–43. For example, in New York City, families typically wait for eight years. Id. at 443. Like-
wise, in Los Angeles, the wait for a Section 8 voucher can be up to ten years. Id. 
 82 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 236–37; Geller, supra note 54, at 162. 
 83 See Loss of Subsidized Multifamily Housing Units: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & 
Cmty. Dev. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 17 (1986) [hereinafter 
House Hearing on Loss of Subsidized Units] (statement of Rep. Barney Frank) (noting the “fool-
ish[ness]” of previous administrations when they allowed for inclusion of twenty-year prepayment 
clauses); Geller, supra note 54, at 160–61. 
 84 See Geller, supra note 54, at 162. 
 85 See id. at 161–62. Gentrification describes the process where comparatively wealthy people 
purchase cheap real estate in low-income neighborhoods. See House Hearing on Loss of Subsidized 
Units, supra note 83, at 3 (describing the process of gentrification in context of why Sections 
221(d)(3) and 236 units are at risk). This demand drives property values up, making the neighborhood 
less accessible to low-income people. See Godsil, supra note 32, at 319. This process continues until 
the entire neighborhood has been converted to high rents. See id. at 319–20. 
 86 See Geller, supra note 54, at 161–62. HUD did not foresee this change in the 1960s. Id. at 161. 
The prevailing wisdom at the time was that poor areas would always remain poor. Id. The government 
was focused primarily on developing the suburbs because it saw those areas as the future affluent 
neighborhoods, leaving the cities to the poorer communities. See Godsil, supra note 32, at 329 (de-
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made to the tax code in 1986 made affordable housing a less desirable invest-
ment for developers.87 
The result of changes in the housing market and tax code was that owners 
participating in affordable housing programs sought to leave the program, 
while very few new participants emerged.88 Property owners whose mortgages 
included prepayment clauses planned to prepay in numbers that posed a seri-
ous threat to the housing situation of hundreds of thousands of people across 
the country.89 Congress realized that a large number of property owners pre-
paying their subsidized and insured mortgages would create a major crisis be-
cause tens of thousands of affordable units would suddenly become unafforda-
ble for their tenants, and those tenants would have few options for alternative 
housing.90 
Faced with a substantial loss of affordable housing units, Congress took 
steps to prevent owners from exercising their prepayment clauses by passing 
emergency legislation aimed at preserving existing affordable housing.91 First, 
Congress passed the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 
1987 (“ELIHPA”), which prohibited owners of properties eligible for prepay-
ment from converting their affordable units to market-rate rentals unless they 
first complied with cumbrous requirements.92 This law effectively prevented 
                                                                                                                           
scribing that the homeownership push of the 1970s favored white, middle class families and neglected 
minority urban neighborhoods). 
 87 Geller, supra note 54, at 162. Prior to the tax code change, developers could use affordable 
housing developments as a kind of tax shelter. Id. The 1986 updates tied the total tax deduction that 
developers could receive from depreciation on a building to the amount of rental income earned from 
that building. Id. This change made investing in affordable housing much less desirable. See id. 
 88 See id. at 161–62. 
 89 See id. at 162–63. 
 90 See House Hearing on Loss of Subsidized Units, supra note 83, at 2−3; Geller, supra note 54, 
at 161–62. 
 91 See Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 
(LIHPRHA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4125 (2012) (codified as Title VI within the Cranston-Gonzalez 
National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990)); Emergency Low 
Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), Pub. L. No. 100-242, §§ 201–263, 101 Stat. 
1877 (1988) (codified as Title II within the Housing & Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-242, 101 Stat. 1815 (1988)); Freedman, supra note 36, at 745; Geller, supra note 54, at 163. 
 92 See ELIHPA § 1715l note; Freedman, supra note 36, at 753. ELIHPA authorized HUD to offer 
additional incentives to mortgagors to discourage prepayment while placing strict conditions of pre-
payment on those who chose to forego the incentives. Geller, supra note 54, at 163–64. Specifically, 
Congress required owners to file a “plan of action” demonstrating to HUD that prepayment would not 
unduly burden low-income tenants. Id. Within the plans of action, ELIHPA required owners to prom-
ise that their tenants’ cost of living would not rise and that there was comparable housing available in 
the area. Id. at 164. Congress’s stated purpose for ELIHPA was: 
(1) to preserve and retain to the maximum extent practicable as housing affordable to 
low income families or persons those privately owned dwelling units that were pro-
duced for such purpose with Federal assistance; (2) to minimize the involuntary dis-
placement of tenants currently residing in such housing; and (3) to continue the partner-
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owners from exercising the prepayment clause because the conditions were so 
onerous.93 Congress then replaced ELIPHA with the Low Income Housing 
Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 (“LIHPRHA”).94 Unlike 
ELIPHA, LIHPRHA made it possible for owners to prepay their mortgages, but 
continued to impose prepayment restrictions and provide incentives if the owner 
remained in the program.95 The incentives included increased rent ceilings, in-
creased allowable rates of return on investments, and equity loan funds for capi-
tal improvements.96 In addition, many non-profit purchasers were able to receive 
direct capital grants if they purchased the properties.97 In exchange for the bene-
fits the Act gave to private owners, owners did not prepay their mortgages, so 
affordability restrictions in those mortgages remained in place.98 
LIHPRHA was not a lasting solution to the problem of disappearing af-
fordable housing.99 Most critically, the constitutionality of LIHPRHA was 
challenged in court, successfully in some cases.100 Owners contested the gov-
                                                                                                                           
ship between all levels of government and the private sector in the production and oper-
ation of housing that is affordable to low income Americans. 
ELIHPA § 202(b). 
 93 See Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 2003). Prior to ELIHPA, many own-
ers were permitted to prepay their mortgages after twenty years without HUD approval. See Cienega 
X, 503 F.3d at 1270. 
 94 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 728; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4125. 
 95 See § 4108; see also Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1272–73 (describing the restrictions and incentives 
under LIHPRHA). Under LIHPRHA, Congress required owners to offer their property for sale to 
preservation buyers—owners who agreed to preserve the unit’s rent restrictions—and barred the own-
ers from prepaying while the properties were for sale. See § 4110; Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1272. 
LIHPRHA required owners to sell the property to preservation buyers at “fair market value of the 
housing based on the highest and best use of the property.” § 4103. If, after fifteen months, the owners 
were unable to sell the property, the owners were permitted to prepay their mortgages. See § 4110; 
Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1272. 
 96 See Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1273. 
 97 See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 6 & n.1. 
 98 See id. at 6. 
 99 See Quirk, supra note 17, at 664 (noting that, while Congress has never explicitly repealed 
LIHPRHA, Congress has defunded LIHPRHA and in 1996 HUD stopped reviewing LIHPRHA pre-
payment applications). 
 100 See Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega VIII), 331 F.3d 1319, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(holding that ELIHPA and LIHPRHA abrogated owners’ property interests and therefore the provi-
sion that restricted owners from prepaying their mortgages was an unconstitutional regulatory taking 
under the Fifth Amendment); Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 734 (holding state laws that create additional 
requirements for prepaying federal mortgages are preempted by LIHPRHA and are void); see also 
CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1244, 1248, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (recognizing that, 
while the particular owner did not have a valid contract or takings claim against HUD, LIHPRHA 
may still be an unconstitutional regulatory taking if the owner satisfies the requirements laid out in 
Cienega X). The results of challenges based on breach of contract theory were mixed. Compare CCA, 
667 F.3d at 1253 (dismissing the contract claim for lack of privity under the reasoning put forth in the 
Cienega line of cases), and Cienega IV, 194 F.3d at 1246 (holding that owner did not have a contract 
claim against HUD due to a lack of privity), with Aspenwood Inv. Co. v. Martinez, 335 F.3d 1256, 
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ernment’s refusal to allow prepayments under theories of breach of contract as 
well as under the Fifth Amendment takings clause.101 In Cienega Garden v. 
United States, for example, the owners were successful, with the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding that the prepayment prohibition under 
LIHPRHA constituted an uncompensated regulatory taking.102 
In 1996, the federal government restored owners’ prepayment rights with 
the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act (“HOPE Act”).103 To address 
the problem of tenants displaced when properties converted to market rent, Con-
gress relied on the Enhanced Voucher program.104 Enhanced vouchers are given 
automatically to tenants who rent from owners who decided to prepay their 
mortgages and convert their units to market-rate rent.105 The program provided 
                                                                                                                           
1260–61 (10th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing with Cienega IV and holding HUD did breach its contract with 
development owner when HUD prevented the owner from prepaying its mortgage), and People to End 
Homelessness, 339 F.3d at 5 (holding HUD could not require owners to renew Section 8 HAP con-
tracts). 
 101 See, e.g., CCA, 667 F.3d at 1253 (breach of contract theory); Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1270 
(takings clause theory); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under the Fifth Amendment, the government 
may not take private property for public use without just compensation. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. In 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the U.S. Supreme Court set out a three-factor test 
to determine whether there has been an unconstitutional regulatory taking such that the government 
owes the private party just compensation. See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Following Penn Central, 
courts must consider (1) “the character of the government action,” (2) “the economic impact” of the 
government action, and (3) “whether the regulated parties had reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions that they would not be subjected to such regulation.” Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1279 (citing Penn 
Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). Development owners brought suits against HUD under a takings clause theo-
ry, alleging that the government, by preventing them from prepaying their mortgages, had effectively 
taken their property, resulting in economic harm to the owners. See id. at 1290; Cienega VIII, 331 
F.3d at 1328. 
 102 Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1290. Cienega X was dismissed by agreement of the parties before the 
Supreme Court decided whether to grant certiorari. Cienega v. United States, 554 U.S. 938, 938 
(2008) (discussing that Cienega X was dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46); see also SUP. 
CT. R. 46 (permitting parties to voluntary dismiss a petition for certiorari when the parties agree to do 
so). 
 103 Housing Opportunity Program Extension (“HOPE”) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120, §§ 1–
13, 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Cienega X, 503 
F.3d at 1274. The political climate had changed significantly by the mid-1990s and congressional 
concerns about housing turned more on its expense than on an expiring mortgage crisis. See David B. 
Bryson, How the Clinton Administration and the 104th Congress Impaired Poor People’s Rights to 
Housing, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1154, 1154–56 (1997). HOPE provided that owners who prepaid 
could not raise rents for an additional two months after prepayment. See HOPE Act § 2(b); Cienega X, 
503 F.3d at 1274. One month after Congress enacted HOPE, Congress passed an appropriations bill 
which expressly permitted owners to prepay their HUD-created mortgages. Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 
1274 (citing Pub. L. No. 103-134, 110 Stat. 1321-265 to 1321-293 (1996)). While HOPE and the 
accompanying appropriation bill effectively overrode LIHPRHA, LIHPRHA was never actually re-
pealed. See Quirk, supra note 17, at 664. 
 104 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) (2012); Kristin A. Siegesmund, Essay: The Looming Subsidized 
Housing Crisis, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1123, 1133 (2000). 
 105 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(2); Siegesmund, supra note 104, at 1134. 
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such tenants with a voucher to cover the difference between the affordable rent 
the tenant was paying and the new market rent the owner decided to charge.106 
Still, enhanced vouchers are tied to the particular tenant.107 The tenant 
may use the voucher in her current unit or bring it with her to a new unit.108 
Once the tenant leaves her unit, however, the government no longer subsidizes 
rent for the old unit for any incoming tenant, and another affordable housing 
unit is permanently lost.109 Consequently, in Massachusetts alone, between 
1996 and 2009 approximately 15,300 federally- and state-assisted units were 
lost, mostly due to mortgage prepayment.110 Approximately 8600 of the 15,300 
lost units became less affordable to low-income tenants, though they retained 
some affordability protections.111 The approximately 6700 remaining units re-
tained no affordability protections at all and were lost forever from the afford-
able housing stock.112 
Despite these congressional measures, efforts to stop the hemorrhaging of 
affordable units due to mortgage prepayment are about to become moot, as 
most of the mortgages subject to Section 236 will soon reach maturity.113 In 
other words, there will no longer be an issue of prepayment after these mort-
gages reach the forty-year mark.114 At that point, the problem will simply be 
the expiration of all use restrictions on these properties and the widespread, 
unchecked conversion of affordable units to market-rate rent.115 
II. MATURING MORTGAGES AND THE INADEQUACIES OF HOUSING 
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 
The forty-year deadline has therefore created a problem for the federal 
and state governments and those who rely on affordable housing.116 While the 
measures passed by Congress in the late 1980s helped avoid a major housing 
crisis, they were only a stopgap.117 The emergency legislation to prevent own-
ers from prepaying their mortgages was able to preserve some affordable hous-
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Siegesmund, supra note 104, at 1133. 
 107 See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 6. 
 108 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 244. 
 109 Id. at 237. 
 110 See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 6. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 238. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id.; Freedman, supra note 36, at 761. 
 117 See Siegesmund, supra note 104, at 1332–33. 
74 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:59 
ing, despite court challenges.118 Still, the legislation had an inherent sunset 
date when the mortgages at issue arrived at the forty-year mark and matured.119 
The maturity date is the source of the looming crisis in affordable housing.120 
All of the concerns of the 1980s remain—namely, that owners of affordable 
developments will choose to exit the affordable housing business in order to 
convert the units in their developments to the more profitable market rate, and 
that tenants will be left without alternative affordable housing for the foreseea-
ble future.121 
Currently, exiting affordable housing programs is the most logical eco-
nomic decision for development owners.122 The value of land has increased 
and the profit that owners may make by renting on the open market has far 
surpassed the financial benefits they once received from federal subsidies to 
develop properties.123 When owners are able convert affordable units to mar-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See, e.g., CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1244, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding 
owner did not have a valid takings claim against HUD and therefore could not prepay his mortgage 
without following LIHPRHA); Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega IV), 194 F.3d 1231, 1246 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding owner did not have a contract claim against HUD due to a lack of privity). 
In CCA Associates v. United States, the owner of a housing development in New Orleans sued the 
United States government under theories of breach of contract and regulatory takings when he was 
prevented from prepaying his federally subsidized mortgage because of restrictions under LIHPRHA. 
667 F.3d at 1243–44. The court held that the owner’s demonstrated eighteen percent loss in the value 
of the property due to the LIHPRHA restrictions did not constitute a regulatory taking. Id. at 1247. 
The court also held that CCA’s contract claim was foreclosed by its earlier decision in Cienega IV, 
which denied the owner’s contract claim because of lack of privity between it and HUD. Id. at 1249; 
see also Cienega IV, 194 F.3d at 1246. The Cienega line of cases grappled with the issues of whether 
the restriction on owners’ rights to prepay their Section 221(d)(3) and 236 mortgages introduced by 
the ELIHPA and LIHPRHA legislation constituted a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
See CCA, 667 F.3d at 1242, 1244 (summarizing the Federal Circuits’ string of Cienega cases). Taken 
together, the Cienega cases held that the inquiry into whether an owner had a valid takings claim 
against the government turned on the circumstances of each case, and specifically required the owner 
to show economic harm, as defined by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City, but that the harm had to be evaluated with respect to the value of the property as a whole 
and not limited to the discrete time period that the legislation was in force. See Cienega Gardens v. 
United States (Cienega X), 503 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Cienega Gardens v. United States 
(Cienega VIII), 331 F.3d 1319, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 119 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 238. 
 120 See id. (stating that the crisis is expected to affect 190,000 total units nationally). 
 121 See House Hearing on Loss of Subsidized Units, supra note 83, at 2−3 (laying out Congress’s 
concern about prepayment in the 1980s); Cowing, supra note 8, at 239–41 (noting that, in Los Ange-
les, an area where property is especially expensive, tenants are particularly vulnerable to the maturing 
mortgage problem); Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that tenants will be inadequately protect-
ed after the subsidized mortgages mature). 
 122 See Geller, supra note 54, at 162. 
 123 See id.; see also House Hearing on Loss of Subsidized Units, supra note 83, at 2–3 (statement 
of Rep. Barney Frank) (warning, in 1986, that in Texas and Massachusetts, the increased value of land 
would prompt owners to convert subsidized developments to market rate). 
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ket-rate rents, the damage to the affordable housing stock will be severe.124 
Nationwide, between 2012 and 2020, the crisis is predicted to cause approxi-
mately 72,000 units unassisted by subsidies like Section 8 to be completely 
lost to the affordable housing market, and will affect, in total, approximately 
190,000 units.125 Not only will there be far fewer units for low-income indi-
viduals, but there are also fewer protections in place for the tenants that will be 
displaced once their affordable units are no longer affordable.126 
A. The Unlikelihood of Successful Federal Efforts to  
Preserve Affordable Housing 
On the federal level, there is currently little political will to extend gov-
ernment-funded housing.127 Budgetary constraints have squeezed all govern-
ment programs, and federal housing programs are likely to continue to be 
downsized.128 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 238; Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 12–13 (noting that, due to 
recent increased demand for rental housing following the financial crisis, the stress on the housing 
market will be exacerbated when these mortgages mature and affordable units are lost). 
 125 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 238. If a unit’s only source of affordability is through a use re-
striction clause in a Section 221(d)(3) or Section 236 mortgage, then the unit is completely free to be 
rented at market rate after those mortgages expire. See id. at 240. Some units, however, are subsidized 
through a combination of programs so that, if its Section 221(d)(3) or Section 236 mortgage matures, 
the unit will maintain some affordability according to the terms of the other programs that cover it, 
such as project-based Section 8 subsidies. See id. 
 126 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 238 (noting that, in 2011, Congress passed legislation that set 
aside funding for vouchers to protect unassisted tenants who are at risk due to maturing subsidized 
mortgages, and therefore implying that those tenants might at least be partially protected by the 
voucher). 
 127 See Freedman, supra note 36, at 742–43; President’s Budget Calls for $1 Billion for NHTF 
Sixth Year in a Row, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://nlihc.org/
article/president-s-budget-calls-1-billion-nhtf-sixth-year-row (noting that President Obama’s 2014 
proposed budget calls for funding to be indefinitely suspended for the National Housing Trust Fund 
(“NHTF”)). The NHTF was created in 2008 as a provision of the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act. See Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 
42 U.S.C.). The NHTF normally allocates ninety percent of its funds to the “production, preservation, 
rehabilitation, or operation of rental housing” for extremely-low income households. See National 
Housing Trust Fund Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Sept. 2013), 
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/NHTF_FAQ.pdf. Under the statute, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
fund the NHTF by transferring a portion of the new business that they receive to the NHTF. Id. This 
requirement was suspended when Fannie and Freddie were taken into receivership, and, as of the 
publication of this Note, the suspension remains in place. Id. This type of budget freeze is not a new 
trend. See Bryson, supra note 103, at 1156 (describing the high cost of running HUD, the conservative 
movement against HUD in the early 1990s and the liberal response that reinvented many of HUD’s 
programs to focus more on private sector solutions). 
 128 See James E. McDermott, What Will 2013 Mean for the Housing Industry?, 21 J. AFFORDA-
BLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 265, 266 (2013) (describing the effect of the sequestration on HUD 
programs including Section 8); Freedman, supra note 36, at 742 (describing the shift away from gov-
ernment funded housing beginning in the Reagan administration). In his 2013 budget, under the 
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The Enhanced Voucher program established in 1999 has operated as a 
major safety net to households affected by the conversion of affordable hous-
ing, but it applies only to those who live in developments where the owners 
decided to prepay their mortgages.129 Congress has not extended the Enhanced 
Voucher program to cover tenants displaced due to maturing mortgages.130 
This means that tenants who can no longer afford to live in their units because 
they are converted to market-rate rent as a result of an expiring mortgage are 
ineligible for the Enhanced Voucher program and will have to find a new place 
to live if they cannot afford the higher rent.131 In some cases, this may mean 
reapplying for a different federal program, most likely the Section 8 pro-
gram.132 This is almost an utterly meaningless protection, however, because the 
Section 8 program is already overwhelmed.133 In many areas around the coun-
try, there are significant wait times in order to become eligible for a Section 8 
voucher.134 
Further, for those seeking to prevent this conversion from happening, 
there are fewer options today than there were in the 1980s.135 During the pre-
payment crisis, attempts by Congress and HUD to legislatively revise their 
                                                                                                                           
thumb of sequestration, President Obama proposed a cut of $640 million from project-based rental 
assistance. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 124 (2013) [hereinafter OBAMA’S 2013 PROPOSED BUDGET], 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/budget.pdf. See 
generally Estimated Cuts in Federal Rental Assistance Due to Sequestration, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-28-13hous.pdf (detailing reductions in 
housing vouchers and public housing in nearly every state). 
 129 See Siegesmund, supra note 104, at 1133; Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 12. 
 130 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 243–44 (noting that advocates of subsidized housing are pressing 
owners to prepay their mortgages so that the tenants may qualify for the Enhanced Voucher program). 
 131 See id. 
 132 See id.; Williams, supra note 7, at 442 (noting that local housing authorities use Section 8 
vouchers to assist tenants who are displaced and that Section 8 is the most prominent source of fund-
ing for low-income tenants). 
 133 See Williams, supra note 7, at 442–43. For the last ten years, the national average time on the 
waiting list has been between ten and eleven months. See id. at 442 (describing the national average 
wait time for Section 8 assistance in 2004 as eleven months); Yumiko Aratani et al., Rent Burden, 
Housing Subsidies and the Well-Being of Children and Youth, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILD. & POVERTY 7 
(Nov. 2011), http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_1043.pdf (describing the national average 
wait time to receive a Section 8 voucher in 2011 as ten months). In some states, the wait is much 
longer. Aratani et al., supra, at 8. In Massachusetts, the wait time in 2011 was nineteen to twenty-four 
months; in California the wait was anywhere from twenty-five to thirty months. Id. 
 134 See Aratani et al., supra note 133, at 7, 9 (noting that HUD reported a national average time on 
the waiting list of eleven months or longer for a spot in public housing and twenty-eight months for a 
Section 8 voucher). 
 135 See Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1283 (discussing the importance of weighing the public benefit of 
LIHPRHA against the private cost to owners and partially justifying LIHPRHA based on this public 
benefit); Freedman, supra note 36, at 747 (discussing the effect of the federal prepayment legislation 
on state laws that tried to prevent the prepayment crisis); Geller, supra note 54, at 167 (discussing the 
questionable legality of legislation aimed at preventing prepayment). 
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previous agreements on mortgage prepayment were legally and politically 
challenged, and in some cases were ultimately defeated.136 Because Congress 
stood on legally untenable ground when it enacted measures to prevent pre-
payment, the current Congress likely would face similar challenges, should it 
seek to force owners to extend a contract that contains no provision mandating 
such an extension.137 
Similarly, efforts to extend the Enhanced Voucher program to tenants dis-
placed by expiring subsidized mortgages would likely face an uphill battle be-
cause an extension would require Congress to allocate scarce federal funding 
to the program.138 Although Congress passed legislation in 2012 allowing 
HUD to award vouchers to tenants residing in units affected by expired HUD-
subsidized mortgages, the program is limited.139 This program, passed as part 
of the 2012 appropriations bill, is in effect until the funding is exhausted; it is 
therefore reliant on the future will of Congress to continue to allocate funds for 
these vouchers.140 Initially, Congress limited the appropriation to $10 million, 
but HUD, due to funding constrains in other housing programs, has allocated 
only $4 million of the appropriation to the new voucher program.141 Given the 
limited and tenuous nature of the 2012 voucher appropriation, Section 8 re-
mains the primary federal program that assists with rental affordability even 
though it is already at capacity.142 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See CCA, 667 F.3d at 1244, 1248 (holding that the owner did not have a valid contract or 
takings claim against HUD, but affirming the precedent in Cienega X recognizing takings claims 
against LIHPRHA); House Hearing on Loss of Subsidized Units, supra note 83, at 3 (suggesting there 
would be no increase in federal housing assistance in budget climate). 
 137 See Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1283; Geller, supra note 54, at 167; Freedman, supra note 36, at 
748. 
 138 See Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 12 (noting the vulnerability of tenants in maturing mortgage 
units because they are not guaranteed Enhanced Vouchers); McDermott, supra note 128, at 265 (not-
ing the budgetary constraints created by sequestration for all federal programs). Between fiscal year 
2005 and fiscal year 2006, the requested federal budget for HUD fell by nine percent. See MAGGIE 
MCCARTY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32899, HOUSING ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 
(2005) (located at “Summary” page, which is prior to the Table of Contents). From 2010 to 2013, the 
budget allotment to HUD fell from $46.9 billion to $33.6 billion. See MAGGIE MCCARTY & DAVID 
RANDALL PETERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42578, TRANSPORTATION, HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES (THUD): FY2013 APPROPRIATIONS 5 (2013). 
 139 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, 125 
Stat. 552, 677 (2012) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NO-
TICE PIF-2013-08 2 (2013) [hereinafter HUD NOTICE PIF-2013-08] (noting that of the ten million 
dollars allocated by Congress for the new voucher program, HUD will only allocate four million to 
that program due to funding concerns in other existing programs). 
 140 See 125 Stat. at 676. 
 141 See HUD NOTICE PIF-2013-08, supra note 139, at 1. 
 142 See Williams, supra note 7, at 442–43 (noting that in New York City, families typically wait 
for eight years, and that likewise in Los Angeles, the wait for a Section 8 voucher can be up to ten 
years). 
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B. State Efforts to Preserve Affordable Housing 
The dearth of funding and initiative at the federal level leaves the problem 
of expiring mortgages to the states.143 States administer the federal subsidized 
housing programs through local public housing authorities, state housing agen-
cies, and their own legislation and regulation.144 As a result, some states at-
tempted to take action to combat the maturing mortgage crisis and enacted 
their own legislation, requiring owners of affordable housing developments to 
meet strict criteria before prepaying their mortgages.145 In the 1980s, this state 
legislation met court challenges.146 In Forest Park II v. Hadley, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a Minnesota state law that required 
owners to clear hurdles in addition to those required by LIHPRHA before pay-
ing their mortgages was preempted by the federal statute.147 The court held that 
the Minnesota statute impermissibly restricted or inhibited the owners’ ability 
to prepay their mortgages. 148 Forest Park II serves as a warning to states that 
legislation addressing low-income housing may unconstitutionally interfere 
with federal low-income housing programs.149 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Freedman, supra note 36, at 761. 
 144 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40T, §§ 1–10 (2012) (mandating requirements that owners of 
developments in Massachusetts must follow to preserve affordable housing). 
 145 See id.; Freedman, supra note 36, at 777 (discussing California laws that place restrictions on 
owners before prepayment). States with preservation laws include California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. 
See State & Local Preservation Initiatives, NAT’L HOUS. L. PROJECT, http://nhlp.org/resourcecenter
?tid=129 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
 146 See Freedman, supra note 36, at 774; see, e.g., Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 733–34 
(8th Cir. 2003). 
 147 See Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 732–34. Minnesota enacted statutes that required owners to 
clear additional hurdles before prepaying their Section 236 mortgages. See id. at 730. 
 148 See id. at 733. The court reasoned that housing is not a traditional area of state concern, so its 
statutes were not entitled to a presumption against preemption. Id. at 731. The Minnesota law was 
attempting to control a contractual relationship between the federal government and private actors. Id. 
at 731–32. The court held that this law was expressly and impliedly preempted by LIHPRHA’s pre-
payment provision. Id. at 732. The court stated that “to the extent that compliance with additional state 
regulations is required, the statutes have the direct effect of impeding, burdening, and inhibiting the 
prepayment of federal mortgages even if additional requirements may be minimal.” Id. at 733. 
 149 See id. at 733; see also Mother Zion Tenant Ass’n v. Donovan, 865 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66–67 (App. 
Div. 2008) (holding New York City law that codified notice requirements and rights of first offer and 
first refusal when owners of subsidized developments decided not to renew their Section 8 contract to 
be preempted by federal law allowing owners to opt out without these requirements). But see Topa 
Equities, Ltd. v. City of L.A., 342 F.3d 1065, 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding Los Angeles’s rent 
stabilization ordinance, which prevented the owner from raising the rent on existing tenants, even after 
he prepaid his mortgage, was not preempted and distinguishing factually from Forest Park II). 
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Nevertheless, some states have passed legislation aimed at assisting ten-
ants who face rent increases due to mortgage maturity.150 Twelve states, in-
cluding Massachusetts and California, have imposed notice requirements on 
owners who plan to convert affordable units when their federally subsidized 
mortgages mature.151 California state law requires owners to provide two sets 
of notices to both tenants and the local government entity, at both twelve 
months and six months before the rent restrictions expire.152 Owners must also 
provide a separate notice to qualified entities that have directly contacted the 
owner or are on a list maintained by the state.153 This notice informs these 
qualified entities of their right to make an offer to purchase the develop-
ment.154 If an owner does not comply with this law, tenants may seek injunc-
tive relief against the sale.155 
Massachusetts has enacted similar protections.156 In 2009, the Massachu-
setts Legislature enacted its chapter 40T provisions as part of “An Act Preserv-
ing Publically Assisted Housing.”157 Chapter 40T targets the housing crisis in 
two ways.158 First, the statute imposes notice requirements on landlords whose 
federal use-restricted mortgages are about to expire.159 Second, chapter 40T 
offers the Massachusetts agency in charge of housing, the Department of 
Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”), a right of first offer and 
first refusal to purchase the property when an owner prepays or opts out of 
maintaining affordability.160 
The chapter 40T notice requirements mandate that landlords who are 
planning to prepay or opt out of their Section 8 contracts provide notice of 
these actions to a number of parties, including tenants and tenant organiza-
tions, DHCD, and legal services organizations.161 To satisfy chapter 40T’s no-
tice requirements, landlords must: (1) provide notice to the listed parties twen-
ty-four to thirty-six months prior to the termination of the affordability pro-
                                                                                                                           
 150 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65863.10–.11, 65863.13 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
40T, §§ 1–10 (2012); see also Cowing, supra note 8, at 244 (discussing the California preservation 
law); Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the Massachusetts preservation law). 
 151 See State & Local Preservation Initiatives, supra note 145. 
 152 See §§ 65863.10–.11, 65863.13; Cowing, supra note 8, at 244. 
 153 See GOV’T § 65863.11(f). 
 154 See id. 
 155 Id. § 65863.10. 
 156 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40T, §§ 1–10 (2012). 
 157 Id.; Quirk, supra note 17, at 667. 
 158 See ch. 40T, §§ 2–3. 
 159 See id. §§ 1–2. 
 160 See id. § 3; Quirk, supra note 17, at 667. Chapter 40T requires owners to offer DHCD an op-
portunity to purchase their affordable housing prior to the owner entering into an agreement to sell 
such property. See ch. 40T, § 3(a). 
 161 See ch. 40T, § 2. 
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gram (a “Two Year Notice”), (2) send notice to the listed parties twelve to 
eighteen months prior to termination (a “One Year Notice”), and (3) must send 
an “Offer to Sell” to the DHCD.162 
Chapter 40T affords DHCD the right of first offer to buy and the right of 
first refusal for four years after the contract’s termination date.163 Under the 
statute, the owner must allow DHCD to make the first offer to buy the devel-
opment prior to entering into any other agreement to sell a development sub-
ject to affordability restrictions.164 If the owner and DHCD cannot reach a deal, 
and the owner finds another willing buyer, the property owner must again noti-
fy DHCD and allow it to match the offer or negotiate a deal that the owner 
finds acceptable.165 
Still, there are a number of exemptions to chapter 40T that allow owners to 
circumvent these requirements.166 One of the major exemptions permits an own-
er to sell to a purchaser that has either agreed to preserve the affordability of the 
units or agreed to renew the Section 8 contract.167 The Legislature, however, did 
not specify the standards under which an owner’s proposal should be deemed 
sufficient to “preserve affordability.”168 Instead, this determination is explicitly 
delegated to DHCD in the statute.169 DHCD’s definition is context- and fact-
specific as to whether a buyer will preserve affordability.170 This is significant 
because advocates will have to devote resources to monitoring whether this fact-
sensitive standard is indeed resulting in affordable housing preservation.171 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See id.; A Primer on Chapter 40T, COMMONWEALTH WORKFORCE COAL., CMTY. ECON. DEV. 
ASSISTANCE CORP. ¶ 2 [hereinafter CEDAC Primer], cwc.cedac.org/Uploads/Files/
AprimerOnChapter40T.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
 163 See ch. 40T, § 10; Quirk supra note 17, at 668. 
 164 Ch. 40T, § 3. 
 165 See id. § 4; Quirk, supra note 17, at 668. DHCD may transfer the right of first offer and first 
refusal to a government approved third party under the statute. See ch. 40T, § 3; Quirk, supra note 17, 
at 668. 
 166 See ch. 40T, § 6 (enumerating specific exemptions to the mandates in sections 2 and 3 of the 
statute); CEDAC Primer, supra note 162. 
 167 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40T, § 6 (2012). 
 168 See generally id. §§ 1–10. 
 169 See id. §§ 1, 6. 
 170 See id. § 6(iv) (stating that the notice and rights of purchase requirements are not imposed 
upon “a proposed sale to a purchaser pursuant to terms and conditions that preserve affordability, as 
determined by the department”). DHCD has issued regulations governing whether affordability has 
been preserved and places the burden of proof on the owner seeking the exemption. See 760 MASS. 
CODE. REGS. 64.02 (2013). 
 171 Cf. Housing Impact Advocacy, GREATER BOS. LEGAL SERVS., http://gbls.org/impact-
advocacy/housing (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (noting that, following the passage of Chapter 40T, 
Greater Boston Legal Services (“GBLS”) has decided to “monitor the implementation of the new state 
notice protections” in order to protect tenants from landlords who want to sell their mortgages after 
the use restrictions on the mortgages expire). 
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III. THE WAY FORWARD: ENACTING STATE PROTECTIONS  
AND ENSURING ENFORCEMENT 
States must take the lead in ensuring that affordable housing is pre-
served.172 The federal government has not taken steps to directly address the 
expiring use problem since it effectively overrode the Low Income Housing 
Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 (“LIHPRHA”) with 
the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act (“HOPE Act”) in 1996.173 In 
contrast, several states have sought to address the crisis by enacting laws simi-
lar to LIHPRHA that put in place protections for tenants.174 These state laws 
typically include notice requirements and give the state agency a right of first 
offer and first refusal upon sale of an affordable housing development.175 
Nonetheless, even if these laws are passed, state agencies and housing advo-
cates should not rest until compliance with the adopted state preservation laws 
is ubiquitous.176 Without both enactment and enforcement of these preserva-
tions laws, hundreds of thousands of affordable housing units that provide 
homes for tenants in need are at risk of disappearing from the market.177 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See OBAMA’S 2013 PROPOSED BUDGET, supra note 128 (calling for hundreds of millions of 
dollars in cuts to federal rental assistance); Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 5 (describing the impending 
affordable housing crisis in Massachusetts); Freedman, supra note 36, at 742–43 (noting that the fed-
eral government no longer focuses on providing affordable housing and that there is little political will 
within the federal government to focus on affordable housing again); see also Kelli Harsch et al., 
Initiatives and Tools for the Preservation of Affordable Housing in Illinois, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 
& CMTY. DEV. L. 403, 417 (2009) (describing the state of Illinois’ efforts to take the lead on notice, 
offer, and refusal rights). 
 173 See Housing Opportunity Program Extension (“HOPE”) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 
§§ 1–13, 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Low-
Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 (LIHPRHA), 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 4101–4125 (2012) (codified as Title VI within the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Hous-
ing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990)); Quirk, supra note 17, at 664 (noting that the 
HOPE Act effectively overrode LIHPRHA). HOPE effectively defunded LIHPRHA and generally 
moved funding from mortgage subsidies toward Section 8. Quirk, supra note 17, at 664. HOPE also 
reversed LIHPRHA’s moratorium on prepayment and allowed owners to pay off their mortgages 
without HUD approval. Id. Importantly, because LIHPRHA was never repealed, owners continued to 
rely on LIHPRHA’s preemption clause to counter state attempts to impose restrictions on owners 
declining to renew their HUD contracts or to pay off their mortgages. See, e.g., Forest Park II v. Had-
ley, 336 F.3d 724, 733 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding LIHPRHA preempted a Minnesota state statute that 
placed additional requirements on owners seeking to exit federal housing contracts). 
 174 See LIHPRHA §§ 4101–4125; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65863.10–.11, 65863.13 (2009); 310 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/2 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40T, § 6 (2012). 
 175 See, e.g., GOV’T § 65863.10 (establishing notice requirements); ch. 40T, § 2 (same). 
 176 Housing Impact Advocacy, supra note 171 (stating that GBLS, a housing advocacy organiza-
tion, is maintaining efforts to ensure landlords are complying with the Massachusetts preservation 
laws in order to protect tenants from losing their subsidized housing). 
 177 Cowing, supra note 8, at 238 (noting that by 2020 the expiring use problem is expected to 
affect 190,000 affordable housing units); James R. Grow, State and Local Regulatory Initiatives to 
Preserve At-Risk Affordable Housing, NAT’L HOUS. L. PROJECT 1, http://www.housingpolicy.org/
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A. The Importance of Enacting Strong State Preservation Laws 
Twelve states and ten cities have enacted legislation aimed at preserving 
affordable housing.178 These jurisdictions must ensure that the laws are pro-
tected and enforced.179 States should learn from the litigation surrounding the 
efforts to remedy the prepayment crisis and be prepared to defend their preser-
vation statutes.180 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, some statutes that granted 
tenants protections beyond those promised in federal legislation were chal-
lenged by development owners in court.181 States seeking to protect their 
preservation statutes must be ready for potential preemption challenges be-
cause some state laws that have required owners to follow additional preserva-
tion requirements have already been preempted by LIHPRHA.182 In Minneso-
ta, for example, the Eighth Circuit in Forest Park II v. Hadley held that the 
procedures required of owners under LIHPRHA were exhaustive and therefore 
states could not impose additional conditions on owners.183 
First, state preservation laws, such as those enacted by Massachusetts and 
California, should include robust notice provisions to ensure that tenants, ten-
ant organizations, community development organizations, and state agencies 
have a chance to act to preserve housing threatened by sale or expiring mort-
gages.184 As in Massachusetts, notice should be provided at least one or two 
                                                                                                                           
assets/preservation%20resources/Grow.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (discussing the importance of 
enacting preservation legislation in states and local governments to preserve affordable housing due to 
the impending expiring use crisis); Housing Impact Advocacy, supra note 171 (discussing the im-
portance of compliance with the notice provisions of the preservations laws). 
 178 See State & Local Preservation Initiatives, supra note 145. The states include California, Col-
orado, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington. Id. The cities include Chicago, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle. Id. 
 179 Cowing, supra note 8, at 241–42 (noting the impending crisis in Los Angeles and calling for 
local policymaking to preserve affordable housing); cf. Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 734 (holding state 
statute meant to protect low-income tenants was unconstitutional because it was preempted by 
LIHPRHA). 
 180 See Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X), 503 F.3d 1266, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(holding that LIHPRHA, and statutes similar to LIHPRHA, may constitute an unconstitutional tak-
ing); Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 734 (holding state statute preempted by LIHPRHA because it added 
additional requirements to the federal law). 
 181 See, e.g., Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733. 
 182 See id. (holding additional requirements preempted by LIHPRHA); see also Mother Zion 
Tenant Ass’n v. Donovan, 865 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66–67 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that LIHPRHA 
preempted New York City law that codified notice requirements and rights of first offer and first re-
fusal when owners of subsidized developments decided not to renew their Section 8 contract). 
 183 See Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 734. 
 184 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65863.10–.11, 65863.13 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40T, § 6 
(2012); Grow, supra note 177, at 1 (noting the important efforts by states and local governments to 
preserve affordable housing due to the impending expiring use crisis); Housing Impact Advocacy, 
supra note 171 (stating that notice provisions are critical for organizations seeking to preserve afford-
able housing). 
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years prior to an event that could result in the loss of affordable housing.185 
These events include both the expiration of a subsidized mortgage and the sale 
of the property that would undo any affordability provisions.186 Advance no-
tice provided to the state housing agency as well as to designated community 
development agencies and legal services organizations would create a system 
that allows both the state and tenants to mobilize their resources to preserve 
affordable units.187 
Second, state preservation statutes should include a provision that re-
quires that the state housing agency or its designated representative receive a 
right of first offer and first refusal.188 A right of first offer requires the owner to 
first consider an offer by the state agency or community development organi-
zation to buy the property and preserve its affordability.189 These provisions 
are important because they give teeth to the notice requirements.190 Develop-
ment owners that are not subject to these requirements could simply give no-
tice of an intent to sell, then promptly execute a sale that did not preserve the 
development’s affordability without ever considering an offer from a housing 
authority, tenant association, or non-profit organization.191 In other words, no-
tice requirements alone, without a right of first offer and first refusal, only pro-
vide tenant associations with the dubious protection of allowing tenants lead 
time to attempt to find new housing before their current rent increases.192 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See ch. 40T, § 2 (establishing notice requirement); Harsch et. al., supra note 172, at 419 (de-
scribing the danger of insufficient notice for tenants seeking to purchase the property); CEDAC Pri-
mer, supra note 162 (describing the chapter 40T notice requirements). 
 186 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 244 (describing the various events that could result in the loss of 
housing affordability as well as the various events where owners should give notice). 
 187 See, e.g., Housing Impact Advocacy, supra note 171 (noting that, as a legal services agency, 
GBLS is committed to monitoring the implementation of the Massachusetts notice requirements and is 
also committed to organizing tenant associations that fight to preserve affordable housing). 
 188 See, e.g., ch. 40T, § 3; see also Freedman, supra note 36, at 766–67 & n.107 (noting that ad-
vocates describe the rights of first refusal and first offer as the best tools to preserve affordable hous-
ing). 
 189 See Freedman, supra note 36, at 767–68. 
 190 See id. (identifying the California law that requires owners to make offers to sell the convert-
ing property to a list of preservation owners maintained by the state at least twelve months before 
paying off the subsidized mortgage). But see Harsch et al., supra note 172, at 419 (describing that 
tenant associations have difficulties gathering capital in time to buy the specific property to maintain 
its affordability even with the notice requirements). 
 191 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65863.10–.11, 65863.13 (2009) (placing no other sale restrictions 
on owners other than notice requirements and rights of first offer and first refusal); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 40T, §§ 1–10 (2012) (also placing no other sale restrictions on owners besides notice requirements 
and rights of first offer and first refusal). 
 192 See Harsch et al. supra note 172, at 419 (noting that, even when the state has implemented 
notice restrictions, tenant associations often cannot afford to bid on the specific property); Williams, 
supra note 7, at 442 (noting that other affordable housing programs, like the availability of Section 8 
vouchers, are currently overwhelmed and oversubscribed). 
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Unlike earlier preempted state statutes that limited an owner’s ability to 
prepay mortgages, notice requirements applied to expiring subsidized mort-
gages should avoid the preemption challenges.193 This is because state preser-
vation statutes that require notice before owners sell developments with expir-
ing mortgages are not governed by LIHPRHA.194 In addition, requiring notice 
and providing the state with rights of first offer and first refusal would not 
harm the owners’ property rights when the preservation statutes do not man-
date that the owner accept the local housing authority or tenant association’s 
offer to purchase.195 Instead, preservation statutes should only require that the 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Independence Park Apartments v. United States, 449 F.3d 1235, 1241, 1243–45 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (holding that state laws imposing onerous rent control requirements upon buildings that have 
expiring use restrictions are not preempted by federal law, and explicitly rejecting the argument that 
the state law is preempted because it reduced the value of the initial incentive for owners to enter into 
subsidized mortgage contracts); Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733 (holding that state laws were 
preempted by LIHPRHA because they effectively delayed the owners’ ability to convert their units); 
cf. Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of L.A., 342 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that state laws 
were not preempted by LIHPRHA because they did not “restrict or inhibit” the owners’ ability to 
prepay their subsidized mortgage). In Topa Equities, Limited v. City of Los Angeles, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the state rent control law for express preemption—when the 
federal statute has a preemption provision which would apply to the state’s law—and implied conflict 
preemption where complying with the state law frustrates the purpose of the federal law. 342 F.3d at 
1069. The court held that the state law was not expressly preempted by LIHPRHA because it neither 
prohibited nor limited the owner’s right to prepay its mortgage. Id. at 1070. In holding the state law 
was not expressly preempted by LIHPRHA, the court distinguished the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Forest Park II by noting that the statutes at issue in that case “prohibit[ed] prepayment” and forced the 
owner to continue to receive assistance from the federal government, when both parties would other-
wise have terminated their relationship. See id. at 1071 (citing Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733). In 
contrast, in Topa Equities, prepayment rights were not affected and the owner was not required to 
continue in the federal program. See id. at 1070. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit in Topa Equities held 
that the state statute did not frustrate the purpose of federal housing laws and was not preempted on 
conflict grounds because there was no guarantee within any of the federal housing laws that the own-
ers would not be subject to state regulations upon the expiration of their mortgages. See id. at 1071–
72. Likewise, in Independence Park Apartments v. United States, the Federal Circuit expanded on its 
Cienega decisions and held that the Los Angeles rent controls that became effective on developments 
once they exited federal housing programs were neither preempted by LIHPRHA, nor preempted by 
the federal housing statutes that created the federal programs the owners were exiting. See 449 F.3d at 
1242, 1244. The Federal Circuit noted that while state laws may restrict “downstream” profitability 
for development owners and could affect the owners’ decision to prepay their mortgages, such a re-
striction was insufficient to cause these state laws to be impliedly preempted. See id. at 1245. 
 194 See Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 
(LIHPRHA), 12 U.S.C. § 4122 (2012) (codified as Title VI within the Cranston-Gonzalez National 
Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990)) (stating that state laws that 
restrict or inhibit prepayment under LIHPRHA are preempted, but not discussing state laws that re-
strict owners after mortgages expire); cf. Independence Park, 449 F.3d at 1244–45 (noting that neither 
HUD regulations nor the federal mortgage program preempted state rent control laws that applied to 
developments that exited the federal program). 
 195 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40T, § 3(a) (2012) (“[N]o owner shall be under any obligation 
to enter into an agreement to sell [the property with expiring use restrictions] to the department [which 
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housing authority and tenant associations be given the opportunity to make a 
competitive offer.196 
States could further limit any potential negative impact that notice re-
quirements may have by exempting owners from the notice requirements when 
the owner is able to show that it is selling the property to an entity that has 
promised to keep the units affordable at current levels.197 Still, when a state 
legislature does exempt owners from notice requirements and the owners have 
a buyer who promises to “preserve affordability,” the legislature should objec-
tively define the phrase “preserve affordability.”198 Otherwise, such an exemp-
tion could require affordable housing advocates of affordable housing to moni-
tor any potential exemption to ensure that owners are meaningfully complying 
with the statute.199 
Additionally, notice requirements must be meaningfully enforced to pro-
vide protection for tenants.200 One of the primary purposes of state notice laws is 
to allow preservation organizations, such as non-profits, or the municipality it-
self, to purchase the property from the owner in order to preserve the develop-
ment’s affordability.201 In California, during the first six months of the notice 
period, only qualified entities, or those that would preserve the development’s 
affordability, may make offers to buy the property.202 Similarly, in Massachu-
setts, entities offering to preserve the affordability of the expiring subsidized 
units have a right to first offer.203 These offer provisions are meaningless if the 
right to notice is not enforced.204 Notice provisions allow the local housing au-
                                                                                                                           
had offered to purchase the property].”); Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1272–73 (noting that notice require-
ments should not affect the date owners can prepay if notice is timely filed). 
 196 See ch. 40T, § 3(c); Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1272–73. 
 197 See, e.g., ch. 40T, § 6 (stating that owners proposing a sale to a buyer that would preserve the 
affordability of the development is exempt from the notice and rights of first offer and refusal re-
quirements). 
 198 Cf. id. § 1 (directing that the state agency define “preserve affordability” without providing the 
agency objective standards of what such language means); 760 MASS. CODE REGS. 64.02 (2013) (re-
quiring the agency to enter into a subjective, fact-intensive inquiry when the agency considers whether 
the landlord was exempt from the notice requirements of chapter 40T because the landlord sold to an 
owner who promised to preserve affordability). 
 199 See Housing Impact Advocacy, supra note 171 (noting that GBLS has decided to monitor 
whether landlords in Massachusetts are actually preserving the affordability of their properties with 
expiring use restrictions pursuant to chapter 40T). 
 200 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 244 (noting that notice laws provide tenant organizations and 
other preservation advocates time to respond to the owner’s intention to sell and possibly convert the 
affordable units). 
 201 See id.; Achtenberg, supra note 14, at 13 (stating that sufficient notice periods are a critical 
element of rights of first offer and refusal). 
 202 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65863.11(l) (2009). 
 203 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40T, §§ 2, 3(b) (2012). 
 204 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 244 (noting the role of notice laws in allowing preservation buy-
ers to make offers and in generally preserving affordability); Harsch et al., supra note 172, at 419 
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thority and tenant associations to have time to act on their rights of first offer and 
first refusal.205 Both localities and tenants must plan for purchasing these proper-
ties and may need time to gather the necessary capital to make the purchase.206 
Time is the enemy of tenants in developments that are being converted to market 
rate and sufficient notice is a key tool in the preservation toolbox.207 
B. The Importance of Monitoring Compliance with State Preservation Laws 
Finally, state agencies and advocates should monitor compliance with 
these statutes to ensure all notice and first offer requirements are met.208 State 
housing agencies and community development organizations are often working 
at capacity because of diminished budgets and staff shortages.209 Ensuring that 
notice requirements are met, however, must be a priority, and there must be 
state systems established to receive and analyze notice given by developers.210 
As in Massachusetts, state agencies should enlist the support of local tenant 
organizations, legal services providers, and housing non-profits to help ensure 
that notice requirements are followed.211 These organizations should make cer-
                                                                                                                           
(noting that longer notice periods better allow tenant organizations to gather the necessary capital to 
make an offer to buy the development). 
 205 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 244; Harsch, et al., supra note 172, at 419. 
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 207 See Harsch et al., supra note, 172 at 419 (noting that time and money are the two main obsta-
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 208 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 244–45 (noting the importance of enforcing notice and rights of 
purchase requirements); Housing Impact Advocacy, supra note 171 (noting GBLS’s role as an advo-
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 209 See Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES 2, 6 (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf (noting that budget crunches 
lead to layoffs, cancelled contracts, and decline in funding given to non-profit organizations, and that 
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Support GBLS, GREATER BOS. LEGAL SERVS., http://gbls.org/support-gbls (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) 
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that GBLS can only help two out of every five people that seek its services). 
 210 See Cowing, supra note 8, at 244; Harsch, et al., supra note 172, at 419. 
 211 760 MASS. CODE REGS. 64.03 (2013) (requiring that an owner’s notice to sell a subsidized 
property be sent to affected tenants and tenant organizations, the municipality, CEDAC, and the 
DHCD); Housing Preservation, CMTY. ECON. DEV. ASSISTANCE CORP., http://cedac.org/
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tain that procedures, including the timelines for notice set down by statute, are 
followed.212 
In addition, community development groups should monitor regulatory 
efforts to make sure that the rights enshrined in the legislation are not undercut 
by state agencies facing their own budget crunches.213 Moreover, if necessary, 
community organizations should support tenants in undertaking litigation to 
ensure that developers and the state are following state legislative intent.214 
Taken together, enactment and enforcement of state preservation laws will en-
sure that expiring use developments are preserved as affordable housing and 
will protect hundreds of thousands of the most vulnerable families across the 
United States.215 
CONCLUSION 
Affordable housing developments funded through mortgages subsidized 
and insured by the federal government in the 1960s are nearing their maturity 
date. When the vast majority of these mortgages expire in the next six years, 
all use restrictions that required the owners to maintain a certain percentage of 
their developments for affordable housing will expire as well. The federal gov-
ernment, facing both limited funding and limited political will, is unlikely to 
address this maturing mortgage crisis. Thus, state governments and municipali-
ties must lead the charge to preserve affordable housing to mitigate this loom-
ing housing crisis. 
State preservation laws should include important notice provisions that 
prevent development owners from quickly selling their properties and turning 
over affordable units to market-rate rent. In addition, state preservation laws 
should afford a right of first offer and a right of first refusal to the local hous-
ing authorities, or their designee, so that those with an interest in preserving 
affordability have a seat at the bargaining table. Finally, these laws must be 
monitored and defended in court if necessary. Legal services and community 
organizations should watch for compliance by landlords and be ready to de-
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Housing Impact Advocacy, supra note 171; see also Harsch, et al., supra note 172, at 419 
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restrictions that are expected to be lost by 2020); Grow, supra note 177, at 1 (noting that, without the 
enactment of state preservations laws, tenants will not have critical tools—such as notice and the 
rights of first offer and refusal—to protect themselves from losing their affordable housing). 
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fend these laws against cash-strapped state legislatures that may look to roll 
back tenant protections. 
The maturing mortgage crisis will hit its peak in 2020. Consequently, it is 
critical that states take immediate action to preserve the existing stock of af-
fordable housing. Enacting preservation laws, such as those in place in Massa-
chusetts, will prevent the loss of hundreds of thousands of units of affordable 
housing and preserve the homes of tens of thousands of low-income families 
that depend on these programs for shelter. 
